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ABSTRACT
Design and Validation of Receiver Access Control in the Automatic
Multicast Tunneling
Veera Nagasiva Tejeswi Malla
Standard IP multicast offers scalable point-to-multipoint delivery, but no control over
who may send and who may receive the data stream. Participant Access Control has
been developed by Islam and Atwood, but only for multicast-enabled network regions.
Automatic Multicast Tunneling has been developed by the Internet Engineering Task
Force. It extends the range of multicast data distribution to unicast-only network
regions, but provides no Participant Access Control.
We have designed the additional features that AMT must have, so that AMT has
the necessary Participant Access Control at the receiver’s end in the AMT environ-
ment. In addition, we have validated our design model using the AVISPA formal
modeling tool, which confirms that the proposed design is secure.
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Some applications require data to be delivered from a sender to multiple receivers.
Examples of such applications include audio and video broadcasts, real-time delivery
of stock quotes, and teleconferencing applications. A service where data is delivered
from a sender to multiple receivers is called multipoint communication or Multicast.
It provides an efficient way to support high bandwidth, one-to-many applications on a
network. The IP-specific version of the multicast concept is called IP Multicast. In
IP multicast, IGMP (Internet Group Management Protocol) is used to dynamically
register individual hosts in a multicast group. Hosts identify group memberships by
sending IGMP messages to their local multicast router, those routers listen to IGMP
messages and periodically send out queries to discover which groups are active or
inactive on a particular subnet [25]. One major problem in IP multicast is that
even hosts without any permissions are able to join multicast groups, i.e., there is no
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mechanism to prevent unauthorized users from accessing a multicast network. Conse-
quently it became impossible for those service providers who tried to bill for multicast
data usage. Content providers were not interested in paying extra money to trans-
mit multicast streams to those unauthorized users. To overcome this problem and
to make multicast more efficient, Participant Access Control (PAC) was introduced
in [2]. PAC includes Sender Access Control [18], which authenticates and authorizes
each sender and accounts for sender behavior by deploying AAA protocols and Re-
ceiver Access Control [19], which is a scalable, distributed and secure architecture
where authorized end users can be authenticated before delivering any data, using
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) and the Protocol for Carrying Authen-
tication for Network Access (PANA). Although PAC provides access control for IP
multicast, yet it faces a few challenges. It needs all the components between the mul-
ticast source and the receiver(s) to support IP multicast technology, in other words
hosts that are in a unicast-only-network cannot access the multicast transmissions.
Unfortunately, many of the devices that could use IP multicast lack multicast connec-
tivity to networks that carry traffic generated by multicast sources. The reasons for
the lack of connectivity vary, but are primarily the result of service provider policies
and network limitations.
To overcome this problem, a solution was proposed by the Network Group at the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) called Automatic Multicast Tunneling
(AMT). AMT is designed to provide a mechanism for a migration path from a
unicast-enabled region to a fully multicast-enabled backbone without any explicit
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tunnels between them. Without requiring any manual configuration, AMT allows
the hosts to receive multicast traffic from the native multicast infrastructure. In
AMT, multicast queries and reports are exchanged between a Gateway (close to the
receiver) and a Relay (on the multicast enabled network) by encapsulating them in
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) packets. Any IP multicast data packets that are
pertinent to the receiver are also encapsulated by the Relay and sent to the Gateway
for distribution to the receiver. The goal of AMT is to foster the deployment of
native IP multicast by enabling a potentially large number of nodes to connect to
an already-present multicast provider network. Though it has it own advantages, it
provides no Receiver Access Control for multicast groups.
The problems with previous architectures are, IP multicast offers scalable point-
to-multipoint delivery, but no Access Control in it. PAC offers Access Control, but
it is limited to only native multicast environment. AMT extends multicast service to
unicast region, but no Access Control. So, our goal is to combine all, i.e., in addition
to the current features of AMT, we must add PAC features at receivers end.
As a solution we have proposed a design architecture that provides Receiver Access
Control in AMT. The term Receiver Access Control used here means authentication,
authorization and accounting (AAA) functionalities for receivers of a multicast group.
In our architecture we implement Receiver Access Control features of IP multicast at
the receiver’s end in the AMT environment by considering all the security issues. We
have also formally validated our model using the AVISPA tool.
In order to have a better understanding of the architecture, we will discuss more
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about IP multicast and its challenges in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 explains about PAC.
In Chapter 4 we will focus on AMT and its challenges. Chapter 5 explains Problem
statement, goals and in Chapter 6 we will discuss about our model (proposed solu-
tion). Chapter 7 gives information about AVISPA tool and describes how we validate





There are classes of applications that require distribution of information to a defined
set of users. IP multicast, an extension to IP, is required to properly address these
communication needs. As the term implies, IP multicast has been developed to
support efficient communication between a source and multiple remote destinations.
IP multicast protocols and underlying technologies enable efficient distribution of
data, voice, and video streams to a large population of users, ranging from hundreds
to thousands to millions of users. One important design principle of IP multicast is to
allow receiver-initiated attachment (joins) to information streams, thus supporting a
distributed informatics model. A second important principle is the ability to support
optimal pruning such that the distribution of the content is streamlined by pushing
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replication as close to the receiver as possible. These principles enable bandwidth-
efficient use of underlying network infrastructure [26].
2.2 List of Examples
Multicast applications include data casting, distribution of real-time financial data,
entertainment digital television over an IP network, Internet radio, multipoint video
conferencing, distance learning, streaming media applications, and corporate commu-
nications. Other applications include distributed interactive simulation, grid comput-
ing, and distributed video gaming.
2.2.1 Example: IPTV
As an example in the IPTV arena, with the current trend toward the delivery of High-
Definition TV (HDTV) signals, each requiring data flows in the 12-Mbps range, and
the consumers’ desire for a large number of channels (200-300 being typical), there
has to be an efficient mechanism of delivering a signal of 1-2 Gbps in aggregate to a
large number of remote users. If a source had to deliver one Gbps of signal to, say,
one million receivers by transmitting all of this bandwidth across the core network,
it would require a petabyte-per-second network fabric, which is currently impossible.
On the contrary, if the source could send the 1 Gbps of traffic to, say, 50 remote
distributions points (e.g., head ends), each of which then makes use of a local distribu-
tion network to reach 20,000 subscribers, the core network needs to support 50 Gbps
6
Figure 1: Multicast Example
only, which is possible with proper design. For these kind of reasons, IP multicast
is seen as a bandwidth-conserving technology that optimizes traffic management by
simultaneously delivering a stream of information to a large population of recipients,
including corporate enterprise users and residential customers [26]. Figure 1 shows
the difference between unicast and multicast.
2.3 Benefits of IP Multicast
2.3.1 Scalability
IP multicast technology enjoys intrinsic scalability, which is critical for many current
applications. The server does not have to produce data packets for each end user.
It just produces one packet and sends it out. The packet is then duplicated by
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the network routers whenever it is needed. So, on the routing tree, the bandwidth
is not wasted either. Moreover, the source is not aware of all the individual users
session information any more. The end users are managed in a different way by new
participants in the multicast distribution technology [30].
2.4 Multicast Protocols and Concepts
2.4.1 Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP)
Definition
Multicast communication is based on the construct of a group of receivers (hosts) that
have an interest in receiving a particular stream of information, be it voice, video,
or data. Hosts that are desirous of receiving data intended for a particular group
have to join the group using a group management protocol. Hosts should become
explicit members of the group to receive the data stream, but such membership may
be ephemeral and/or dynamic. Groups of IP hosts that have joined the group and
wish to receive traffic sent to this specific group are identified by multicast addresses.
In IP multicast IGMP is used by host receivers to join or leave a multicast host
group. It is used by IPv4-based receivers to report their IP multicast group member-
ship to neighboring multicast routers, i.e., it defines the signaling communication oc-
curring between receiving hosts and their local multicast router. Hosts establish group
memberships by sending IGMP messages to their local multicast router. Multicast-
enabled routers monitor for IGMP messages to maintain forwarding tables for the
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various interfaces on the router. They also periodically send out queries to discover
which groups are active or inactive on a given subnet [26].
IGMPv1
Host membership Report: : When a host wishes to join a multicast group, it
sends an IGMP Host Membership Report message to the specific group address,
regardless of whether there are already other hosts on its subnet that are host group
members. Unlike a multicast router, a host does not keep track of the host group
membership of other hosts on its subnet. Because a multicast router is listening
in multicast promiscuous mode, it receives and processes IGMP Host Membership
Report messages sent to any multicast address.
Host Membership Query: An IGMP v1 multicast router periodically sends an
IGMP Host Membership Query message to 224.0.0.1 (the allhosts group) to refresh
its knowledge of host members on the subnet. For each host group for which there
are members on the subnet, one hosts group member responds with an IGMP Host
Membership Report messages [39].
IGMPv2
Version 2 extends the functionality of IGMP while maintaining backward compati-
bility with IGMP v1. It adds two new message types, an IGMP v2 Host Membership
Report and a Leave group message. It also adds a variation on the Host Membership
Query called the Group-Specific Host Membership Query. Finally IGMPv2 defined
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clearly how a multicast Querier (a router that send Queries) is elected if there are
multiple multicast routers connected to a common network. In IGMPv1, all multicast
routers were expected to send Queries. IGMPv2 stipulates that only the multicast
router with the lowest IP address on the segment shall become the Querier and send
Queries. Other routers are free to listen to the Replies (they have to do it anyway)
but they do not send Queries themselves.
IGMP v2 Host Membership Report: The IGMP v2 Host Membership Report
has the same function as the IGMP v1 Host Membership Report except that it is
intended to be received by IGMP v2 routers.
Leave Group Message: The Leave Group message is used to reduce the time it
takes for the multicast router to stop forwarding multicast traffic when there are no
longer any members in the host group. If a host responds to the last IGMP query, it
might be the last or only member of the host group. When this host leaves the group
it sends an IGMP Leave Group message to 224.0.0.2 (the all routers group). Upon
receipt of the Leave Group message, the router sends a series of group-specific queries
for the host group. If no host responds to the group-specific queries, the router deter-
mines that there are no more members of that host group on that particular subnet
and removes the entry from the IGMP interface group table.
IGMP Group-Specific Query: An IGMP Host Membership Query is sent to
224.0.0.1 (the all hosts group) to query for the group membership of all hosts on the
subnet. IGMP v2 routers can also send a group-specific query, a query for a specific
multicast group sent to the group address [15].
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IGMPv3
Version 3 extends the functionality of IGMP while maintaining backward compati-
bility with IGMPv2. It provides support for a new approach called source specific
multicast (SSM). Instead of specifying the group IP address only, IGMPv3 messages
contain the multicast group IP address and the unicast IP address of the content
source. This combination identifier is represented as (S, G) where S is the unicast IP
address of the source and G is the group address [8].
IGMPv3 does not use leave group messages, as this functionality is provided
through the source address filtering system [26].
2.4.2 Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD)
Multicast Listener Discovery enables management of subnet multicast membership
for IPv6.
MLD v1
Its functionality is similar to IGMPv2.
MLD v2
Its functionality is similar to IGMPv3.
11
Figure 2: IP Multicast Challenge
2.5 Challenges in IP Multicast
• One of the major weaknesses of the existing multicast service model is the
IGMP protocol, which fails to provide any sort of receiver access control (i.e.,
an unauthenticated user can send an IGMP request to join a multicast group).
• Unfortunately, the basic IGMP join message itself is unsecured, which means
that IGMP messages are not encrypted and can be spoofed.
• It is not suitable for the end users who do not have native multicast connectivity.
Only hosts that have native multicast connectivity will receive multicast data.
As shown in Figure 2 the hosts that are in a unicast only network can neither
send multicast-join nor they can receive multicast traffic from the source that
is in a multicast-enabled network.
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Chapter 3
Participant Access Control (PAC)
in IP Multicast
3.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces the reference architecture for multicast access control that is
used in our laboratory and the roles of its components. After, we explain what was
added to this architecture in order to achieve Receiver Access Control in IP multicast.
3.2 Reference Architecture
A secure multicast architecture with sender and receiver access control has been
proposed in [2] and has interacting components as illustrated in Figure 3.
13
Figure 3: Reference Multicast Architecture
3.2.1 Components
A brief description of components is as follows:
End User (EU): A subscriber who wishes to receive multicast data.
End User Device (EUD): A device that is operated by an EU to receive multicast
data.
Merchant (MR): The merchant is actually a web based participant who introduces
and advertises the service to the public. It should be easily accessible for a customer
so that he/she can visit the MR anytime and anywhere in the Internet to choose a
service. The MR is responsible for receiving the order from potential EUs, checking
their ability to pay through trusted communications with Financial Institutions and
issuing the EU a permission ticket to allow him/her to join a multicast session in the
14
future.
Network Service Provider (NSP): The NSP makes use of its internal compo-
nents for delivery and charging issues as well as authentication and authorization of
end users. It receives multicast data from the source and once the end user presents
his permission ticket to the NSP, it delivers the multicast data to authenticated and
authorized end users. The NSP creates an account for each individual end user at
the network edge for further accounting purposes.
CS: Content Server is the actual producer of physical data stream. It is managed by
a Content Provider.
CP: Content Provider is the provider of server-side policies, who communicates with
the Merchant (MR) and the Network Service Provider (NSP) to issue basic policies
and distribute them to all the actors.
FI: Financial Institution is an outsider financial participant (e.g., a bank, a credit
grantor, etc.) who has secure and trusted connections with the MR. The financial
institution approves or disapproves the MR’s request regarding the individual EU’s
ability to pay. Once the FI approves the ability to pay for a specific end user, the
MR becomes assured that the EU can be charged at the end of the session for his
consumed resources. That is, the FI will be responsible for eventually taking money
from the user on the MR’s behalf [30].
AAA Server (AAAS): A device for managing authentication, authorization and
accounting within the NSP.
Access router (AR): A routing device within the NSP, close to the EUD, which is
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responsible for adjudicating access rights to the network.
Network Access Server (NAS): The enforcement function for managing authen-
tication, authorization and accounting within the NSP. Normally co-located with the
AR.
Core Router (CR): A routing device within the NSP that does not have any EUD
connected to it directly.
3.2.2 Information Flow
Moreover, four kinds of information flows are shown in Figure 3. They are as follows
Policy flow: Exchange of policy information.
Purchase flow: The transactions related to subscribing to and paying for a group
session.
Access control flow: The presentation of authentication and authorization infor-
mation. There are two categories: Receiver Access Control flow, which is between
the NSP and receivers (e.g., EUs) and Sender Access Control flow, which is between
the NSP and senders (e.g., CP).
Data flow: The delivery of the subscribed data stream, from the CS through the
NSP to the EUD.
The term Access Control used here mean authentication, authorization and ac-
counting (AAA) functionalities for both sender and receivers of a multicast group.
However, we are limiting our focus to Receiver Access Control in this document.




Access control in IP multicast is achieved with different protocols, which are explained
briefly in subsections below. Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is used to
authenticate EUs for network access. It runs between an EAP peer and an EAP
server, where the EAP peer will request authentication and the EAP server will
authenticate the peer. In some cases the EAP authenticator will act as a pass-through
between EAP peer and EAP server (see Section 3.3.1). In such cases, Protocol for
carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA) is used to carry EAP messages
between the EAP peer and the EAP authenticator (see Section 3.3.2), while the
Diameter protocol is used to carry EAP messages between the EAP authenticator
and the EAP server (see Section 3.3.3).
3.3.1 Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
Definition
Extensible Authentication Protocol [1] is an authentication protocol or framework
that supports multiple authentication methods.
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Components
EAP peer: is an End User(EU) host that attempts to access a network and responds
to the authenticator.
Figure 4: EAP Components
EAP authenticator: is an Access Router (co-located with Network Access Server
NAS as shown in figure 4) that initiates EAP authentication. It can act as a pass-
through (if necessary).
EAP authentication server: or backend authentication server is an entity that
provides an authentication service by executing EAP methods for the authenticator
[30].
Authentication in EAP
The EAP authentication exchange is shown in Figure 5:
1. The authenticator sends a Request to authenticate the peer. The Request has
a type field to indicate what is being requested (e.g., Identity, MD5-challenge,
etc.).
18
Figure 5: EAP Message Exchanges
2. The peer sends a Response packet in reply to a valid Request. As with the
Request packet, the Response packet also contains a type field.
3. The authenticator sends an additional Request packet, and the peer replies
with a Response. The sequence of Requests and Responses continues as long as
needed. Since EAP is a lock step protocol, a new Request cannot be sent prior
to receiving a valid Response to the initial Request.
4. The conversation continues until -
• the authenticator determines that successful authentication has occurred,
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in which case the authenticator must transmit an “EAP success” message.
• or in contrast, the authenticator cannot authenticate the peer, in which
case the authenticator transmits an “EAP failure” message.
3.3.2 Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Ac-
cess (PANA)
Definition
PANA [16] is a network-layer transport for Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
to enable network access authentication between clients and access networks. In EAP
terms, PANA is a UDP-based EAP lower layer that runs between an EAP peer and
an EAP authenticator. The general PANA framework is shown in figure 6.
Components
PANA client (PaC): is an entity of the protocol that resides in the access device
(e.g., laptop). It is responsible for providing the credentials in order to prove its
identity for network access authorization. The PaC and EAP peer are co-located.
PANA Authentication Agent (PAA): is a protocol entity in the network whose
responsibility is to verify the credentials provided by the PaC and authorize network
access to the device. The PAA and EAP authenticator are co-located in same device.
Enforcement Point (EP): is a node on the access network where pre-packet filtering
is done on the inbound and outbound traffic of access devices. EP should prevent
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Figure 6: PANA Framework
data traffic from and to any unauthorized client, unless the data is either a PANA
message or other allowed traffic types (e.g., ARP, DHCP, etc.). The EP and PAA
may be co-located.
Authentication Server (AS): is a conventional back-end AAAS that terminates
the EAP and the EAP methods.
Protocol Overview
PANA messages are sent between the PaC and PAA as part of a PANA session. A
PANA session consists of four distinct phases:
1. Authentication and Authorization phase: This is the phase that initiates
a new PANA session and executes EAP between the PaC and PAA. The PAA
conveys the result of authentication and authorization to the PaC at the end of
this phase.
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2. Access phase: After successful authentication and authorization, the End
User device gains access to the network. Now it can send and receive IP traffic
through the EP.
3. Re-authentication phase: During the access phase, PAA may and PaC
should initiate re-authentication if they want to update the PANA session life-
time before it expires. EAP is carried by PANA for re-authentication.
4. Termination phase: During this phase an explicit disconnect message is sent
by either PaC or PAA to discontinue the access service at any time.
3.3.3 Diameter Protocol
The Diameter protocol [14] is intended to provide an Authentication, Authorization
and Accounting (AAA) framework for applications such as network access or IP
mobility. It evolved from and replaces the much less capable Radius protocol [32]
that preceded it. It is used to carry EAP packets from an EAP Authenticator to the
EAP Authentication Server (AAA Server).
3.3.4 IPsec
Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) is a protocol suite that provides an interoperable,
high quality, cryptographically-based security service for IPv4 and IPv6 networks.
It can be used to protect any traffic across an IP network. The protocol suite is
composed of four main components.
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1. Security protocols, which provide traffic security services, such as authentication
and encryption. There are two variants: Authentication header (AH) [21] and
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [20].
2. The security architecture defined in [22] is based on the concept of a Security
Association (SA). An SA is a simplex logical connection that affords security
services. In IPsec, an SA is a network-level abstraction implemented through the
use of AH or ESP. An arbitrary 32-bit value, called a Security Parameter Index
(SPI), is used by the receiving end of the connection to identify the SA to which
the incoming traffic should be bound. Access to IPsec SAs is managed using
three conceptual databases, they are Security Association Database (SAD),
Security Policy Database (SPD), Peer Authentication Database (PAD). [37]
extends the security architecture to multicast communication. It defines the
concept of a Group Security Association (GSA), which is used to protect the
communications within the group. Access to IPsec GSAs is managed using
three conceptual databases, they are Security Association Database (SAD),
Group Security Policy Database (GSPD), Group Peer Authentication Database
(GPAD). In IPsec for an incoming protected packet, the SPI contained in its
IPsec header is used as an index into the SAD, to determine the parameters for
decoding the packet contents.
For an outgoing packet that is to be protected, destined to a particular peer
address, and having a particular next protocol, the SPD (unicast peer address)
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or the GSPD (multicast peer address) is consulted to determine the SPI that
is specific to that peer and that protocol. The resulting SPI is used to locate
the SAD entry, which in turn specifies the encoding to be used for the packet
contents. If no matching entry is found in the SPD or GSPD, the PAD (uni-
cast case) or the GPAD (multicast case) is consulted to determine which key
management protocol is to be used to establish the SAs between participants or
the GSAs among participants. The key management protocol is responsible for
negotiating the parameters to be placed in the SPD (or GSPD) and the SAD,
corresponding to the newly-established SA (or GSA).
3. Key Management Protocols are used to automatically manage the keys used in
IPsec. IKEv2 is a component of IPsec used for performing mutual authentica-
tion and establishing and maintaining SAs between two devices. It establishes
two SAs between the two devices, one in each direction. The SPI for each di-
rection is chosen by the receiving device, thus ensuring that there is no conflict
between the chosen SPI and any other SPI in use on that device. For multicast
groups, Group Key Management for IPsec GSAs may be done by Group Domain
of Interpretation (GDOI) [38] or by G-IKEv2 [33], which is based on IKEv2.
In this document we use Group Security Association Management (GSAM) as
group key management protocol (see Section 3.3.6) for our specific needs.
4. Cryptographic algorithms are used in security protocols and key management
protocols for authentication and encryption .
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3.3.5 SIGMP
Secure Internet Group Management Protocol (SIGMP) is an extension of IGMP,
which runs among the EUs and the ARs. The EU implements the host portion
of SIGMP while the AR implements the router portion of SIGMP. SIGMP queries
and reports are each divided into two categories, Open Group Query (OGQ), Secure
Group Query (SGQ), Open Group Report (OGR), Secure Group Report (SGR). OGQ
and OGR are for open groups and SGQ and SGR are for secure groups. In SIGMP,
queries and reports for open groups are delivered without any protection, but for
secure groups they are protected by IPsec GSAs. GSAs are of two kinds: GSA-q and
GSA-r. GSA-q is used to protect SGQ messages and GSA-r is used to protect the
SGR messages.
3.3.6 GSAM
The Group Security Association Management (GSAM) protocol is used to manage
the GSAs used in SIGMP (similar to IKEv2 in unicast). The network entities in
GSAM are the same as those in SIGMP, including ARs and EUs. In GSAM, an AR
(specifically, the Querier) plays the role of group controller / key server (GCKS). It
accepts registrations from NQs and EUs that have been authorized at the application
level and grants them group membership in the secure multicast groups that the EUs
are authorized to join. The members of this set of EUs are called Group Members
(GMs). The AR/Q creates and updates SPI, GSA-r and GSA-q for a secure group
and distributes them to GMs in the secure group using secure tunnels. The Q, the
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NQs (if any), and the GMs will update their local SADs and GSPDs according to the
parameters of GSA-q and GSA-r to protect the SIGMP packets.
3.4 Receiver Access Control Interactions in Mul-
ticast Architecture
Figure 7: Receiver Access Control Architecture in IP Multicast
The receiver access control can be viewed at two levels: the application level and
the network level. The work reported in [19] is focused on the application level and
the work reported in [24] is focused on the network level.
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3.4.1 Access Control at Application Level
EU will be issued a “token” by a valid merchant in order to receive data from his
favorite multicast service. The token contains application layer information and is
placed into an EAP packet (see figure 8). For Authentication, Authorization and
Accounting purpose, the packet has to move from the EU to an EAP server. The
AR (co-located with the NAS) forwards the packet as the EAP authenticator to the
EAP server. After successful authentication EAP exports Master key (see 3.4.1). The
EAP packet is carried through PANA framework between the EU and AR (as shown
in figure 8).
As shown in Figure 7 the PANA client (PaC) will be on the EU. On the NSP side
Figure 8: EAP Packet Carriers
of the network segment, there are two PANA-related functions: the PANA Authenti-
cation Agent (PAA) and one or more Enforcement Points (EPs). In the simple case
(only one AR for the network segment), the PAA and the EP will be co-located with
the AR. In more complex cases (more than one AR for a specific network segment),
one AR will have both PAA and EP functions, and the rest will have only the EP
function.
A PANA session consists of 5 different phases (actually four, but first phase is
divided into two). In the following we have explained how the entities will behave in
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our architecture during these phases:
Handshake phase: The PaC (EU), on receiving a request (ticket) from the upper
layer to join a multicast group while no PANA session had been completed yet,
initiates a PANA session by sending a PANA-Client-Initiation message to the PAA
(access router).
Authentication and authorization phase: Immediately following the handshake
phase, PANA will carry EAP messages between the EU and the AR. A AAA protocol
(e.g., Diameter) will carry the EAP exchanges between the AR and AAAS, where the
ticket is validated. On successful authentication, both the AAAS and the PaC derive
the same Master session key (MSK), which is forwarded to the PAA by the AAAS .
Access phase: On receiving the MSK the PAA generates a separate 64 octet PaC-
EP Master Key (PEMK) for each EP [29] and PaC also calculates the same key. One
way of calculating this key is,
PEMK = prf + (MSK, “IETFPEMK”|SID|KID|EPID)
Here, prf+ is a pseudo-random function defined in [28]. “IETF PEMK” is the
ASCII code representation, SID is a four-octet Session Identifier, KID is associated
with the MSK and EPID is the identifier of the EP. This key is specific to the mul-
ticast group that the EU has joined at the application level, and will be used for
authorization at the network layer.
Re-authentication phase: If PANA re-authentication is required, this phase will
trigger a EAP re-authentication, which returns to the access phase upon successful
re-authentication.
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Termination phase: The receiver (e.g., on receiving multicast leave request from
the upper layer) or the AR (e.g., the receivers authorized access has expired or been
revoked) may choose to discontinue the access service at any time. At the end of this
phase, the AR will gather accounting data for the receiver and communicate these
data to the AAAS (using Diameter) for updating the receiver’s account [19].
The EAP packet is then carried through AAA protocol (e.g., Diameter Protocol)
between AR and EAP server (as shown in figure 8). Clearly, a AAA server must be
co-located with the EAP server to receive the Diameter packets, extract the EAP
material and forward them to the EAP server.
3.4.2 Access Control at the Network Level
When the EU makes his/her request for the network-level join and if the request is
for an Open group, the operations are same as in IGMPv2. For the access control of
secure groups the SIGMP (Secure IGMP) module will be invoked, to send the SGR
(Secure Group Report) to the Q. The SGR will be passed to the IPsec module. If this
is the first time that an SGR has been sent for this network-level group, there will
be no corresponding entry in the SAD or the GSPD, so the GPAD will be examined.
The GPAD entry corresponding to this new group will indicate that GSAM is the
appropriate key management protocol. The IPsec module will therefore invoke GSAM
to negotiate Security Association key pairs (GSA-r, GSA-q). It will use the PANA
PEMK (previously stored in the GPAD) for its authentication. Once GSAM has
completed its negotiations, the resulting parameters will be installed in the SAD and
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the GSPD. (This will provide for outgoing and incoming messages, each with its own
SPI and key for this group.) The IPsec module will then be able to send the SGR.
Any subsequent SGR message will be sent using the parameters stored in the GSPD




The following terminology is largely adapted from document [6].
4.1 Definition
Automatic Multicast Tunneling (AMT) allows multicast communication to take place
between hosts, sites or applications that do not have native multicast access and
one or more sources that have native multicast connectivity, to request and receive
SSM and ASM traffic from a network that does provide multicast connectivity to
that source. Without requiring any manual configuration, AMT allows the hosts to
receive multicast traffic from the native multicast infrastructure. AMT operates with
a pseudo interface where UDP-based encapsulation is done to overcome problems of
multicast connectivity.
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Figure 9: AMT Multicast Architecture
4.2 Components
As shown in Figure 9, the roles of components are as follows:
AMT Relay: The relay router terminates one end of tunnel and has one or more in-
terfaces. The downstream interfaces of a relay serves gateways, i.e., the relay accepts
encapsulated IGMP and MLD group membership messages from gateways, encapsu-
lates and forwards the requested multicast traffic back to those gateways.
The upstream interfaces of a relay communicates with a native multicast infras-
tructure, i.e., the relay sends join and prune/leave requests towards multicast sources
and accepts requested multicast traffic from those sources.
AMT Gateway: It is host or a router that terminates the other end of the tunnel.
It does not have native multicast connectivity to the multicast backbone infrastruc-
ture and has one or more interfaces. The downstream side of a gateway serves one or
32
more multicast receivers, i.e., the gateway accepts group membership requests from
receivers and forwards requested multicast traffic back to those receivers. The gate-
way functionality may be directly implemented in the host requesting the multicast
service or within an application running on a host.
The upstream side of a gateway connects to a relay. A gateway sends encapsu-
lated IGMP and MLD messages to a relay to indicate an interest in receiving specific
multicast traffic.
AMT Pseudo-Interface: It is conceptually a network interface on Gateway and
Relay, where the Gateway executes host portion and Relay executes the router por-
tions of IGMP and MLD protocols. It is basically a virtual interface where AMT
encapsulation and decapsulation occurs. Some implementations may treat it exactly
as any other interface and others may treat it as a tunnel end-point.
4.3 IGMP Proxy
The IGMP proxy implementation in the Gateway runs AMT on an upstream interface
and router-mode IGMP/MLD on downstream interfaces to provide host access to
multicast traffic.
The IGMP proxy implemented in the Relay, runs AMT on a downstream interface
and host-mode IGMP/MLD on a upstream interface. This “relay proxy”sends group
membership reports to a local, multicast-enabled router to join and leave specific
SSM or ASM groups. By using an IGMP proxy, the IGMP/MLD protocol behavior
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in AMT, from the point of view of the EU, is exactly the same as in IP multicast.
4.4 AMT Architecture Operations
Initially, let us assume that the multicast-enabled ISP provides the AMT Relay ser-
vice. As shown in figure 10, the hosts connected to the unicast-only network are
acting as AMT Gateways.
Figure 10: AMT
1. When host wants to join a multicast group, it sends a membership report to
gateway thinking that it is an IGMP router (Querier).
2. Before sending the received report, the Gateway will send a Request mes-
sage to the Relay to solicit a general-query response. The Relay responds
by sending Membership Query message back to the gateway. The Member-
ship Query message carries an encapsulated general query that is processed
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by the IGMP or MLD protocol implementation on the Gateway to produce a
membership/listener report. Each time the Gateway receives a Membership
Query message it starts a timer whose expiration will trigger the start of a new
Request. This timer-driven sequence is used to mimic the transmission of a pe-
riodic general query by an IGMP/MLD router. This query cycle may continue
indefinitely once started by sending the initial Request message.
3. After receiving the general query from the Relay, the Gateway will send the
membership report encapsulated to the Relay. Each report is encapsulated and
sent to the Relay after the Gateway has successfully established communication
with the Relay via a Request and Membership Query message exchange (for
more details on membership update sequence refer to [6]).
4. The AMT Relay will decapsulate the IGMP messages and trigger an upstream
PIM join towards the source.
5. Finally the requested multicast data is transferred from the multicast source to
host/EU through the Relay and the Gateway.
4.5 AMT Benefits
4.5.1 Simplicity
To establish the AMT tunnel, the receiving network simply sends a request to the uni-
cast address of the Relay. The rest of the tunnel establishment is done automatically
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without the need for any additional configuration or overhead of manual monitoring.
4.5.2 Efficiency
AMT uses UDP encapsulation, providing different source UDP ports for the encapsu-
lated streams of data, allowing transit routers to perform flow-based load balancing
for more efficient link utilization.
4.5.3 Resiliency
If the Gateway uses an Anycast address to discover the Relay, it will automatically find
the closest Relay. When the Relay becomes overloaded or unavailable the Gateway
is routed to next closest Relay and the routing table is updated automatically [34].
4.6 AMT Challenges
• An intruder can easily impersonate an AMT Relay and Gateway.
• An intruder can learn the value of Message Authentication Code (MAC) suc-
cessfully.





In this chapter, we will mention deficiencies of the previous multicast architectures and
reach to the specific point that we wish to talk about later on as thesis contribution.
Our goal is to find a design solution that can overcome those problems.
5.2 Deficiencies and Goals
Multicast architectures defined in Chapters 3,4 has few limitations and challenges.
Participant Access Control (PAC) architecture in [19] [24] is compatible only in multi-
cast enabled region. It requires that all the components between the multicast source
and the receiver support IP multicast technology; in other words hosts that are in
unicast-only-network cannot access multicast enabled network. Unfortunately, many
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of the devices or applications that use IP multicast lack multicast connectivity to net-
works that carry traffic generated by multicast sources. The solution for the above
problem is the architecture of AMT [6], in which unicast hosts are capable of receiving
multicast data. However, AMT is incapable of differentiating between legitimate and
non-legitimate users. Because IGMP is insecure, there is no control over the users
who are trying to access the network without permission.
Therefore our goal is to add Receiver Access Control features to the current func-
tionality features of AMT and see how those features fit in our model and how the
security considerations are handled.
Usually in IP multicast, Receiver Access Control features are implemented be-
tween the client that wants access to the network and the server that authenticates
and authorizes it. However, in the AMT environment we have a Gateway and a Re-
lay additionally between them. During this process we have to analyze where all the
RAC components will fit in the current model and how they communicate without
causing any distraction to the security considerations. Also, what are the changes
that we need to make in the Gateway and the Relay, so that the whole Receiver Ac-
cess Control functionality in AMT environment reflects the same results and security
as in IP multicast. Considering all these issues, we propose a design solution that
provides Receiver Access Control in the AMT environment.
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Chapter 6
Receiver Access Control in AMT
6.1 Proposed Solution
Here, in this section we are going to explain how a PANA framework is accommodated
into the AMT environment to achieve Receiver Access Control. Figure 11 shows the
AMT architecture with “Receiver Access Control”. The whole design is based on the
fact that all messages and data between EU and AR must pass through the AMT
Tunnel, i.e., between gateway and relay.
6.1.1 PANA Proxy
Usually in IP multicast environment PANA communication is done directly between
PaC and PAA. But in AMT we have additional components called the Gateway
and the Relay between them. We want all the PANA messages to flow through the
Gateway and the Relay. For this to happen, we explicitly do not want the PaC to
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Figure 11: AMT Architecture with Receiver Access Control
know the “real address” of the PAA, because it might allow the messages to flow
outside of AMT tunnel taking another route. Considering above facts we introduced
“PANA Proxy” concept in AMT. In the unicast-only network, the PANA proxy is
implemented in the Gateway and works as a PAA for the PaC, i.e., the PaC assumes
that the Gateway is its PAA and starts exchanging messages with the Gateway. By
default, the PaC discovers the PAA in the Gateway using the normal mechanism for
PAA discovery as defined in [27]. In the native multicast network PANA proxy is
implemented in the Relay and works as a PaC for the PAA, i.e., the PAA assumes
that the Relay is its PaC and communicates with it. The idea of PANA proxy is taken
from PANA Relay Element (PRE) [13], which enables PANA messaging between a
PaC and PAA where the two nodes cannot reach each other by means of regular IP
routing.
The proposed model also implements a PANA Client (PaC) inside an End User
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(EU) host that is residing on the non-multicast enabled network (unicast-only net-
work) looking for an IGMP join. A PANA Enforcement Point (EP) is implemented
inside the AMT Gateway, so that it can transfer the necessary keys to the q (querier)
in the Gateway. The PAA that consults a back-end Authentication Server (AS) for
authentication and authorization of a PaC may co-located with Q or may be on other
device that is residing on the multicast enabled network.
6.1.2 EAP Proxy
PANA carries the methods of the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) that
are responsible for authenticating the PaC, i.e., EU (they are co-located). After
authentication is done, the EAP method exports a Master Session Key (MSK) to the
PaC and the PAA. In AMT, the Gateway and the Relay act as a friendly Man-in
-Middle. As a result they will know (or be able to construct) the MSK for protecting
IGMP messages (see section 6.1.4). Considering this idea, we introduced an EAP
Proxy concept in AMT. In the unicast-only network, the EAP proxy is implemented
in the Gateway and functions as an EAP server for the EAP peer. In the native
multicast network, the EAP proxy is implemented in the Relay and functions as an
EAP peer for the EAP server co-located with the PAA. (Note: EAP peer and PaC
are on same device and EAP authenticator and PAA are co-located).
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6.1.3 SIGMP Proxy
In IP multicast, SIGMP runs between EUs and ARs. In AMT we have the Gateway
and the Relay between and we want all the SIGMP packets to pass through them.
For this to happen, we explicitly do not want the EU to know the real address of
the AR or else the messages might take another route other than AMT tunnel. So
considering the above facts, in the unicast network we have introduced a SIGMP
proxy in the Gateway (as shown in figure 11), which makes EU to think that the
Gateway is its AR/q. (q is querier in gateway, we are calling it as querier because in
AMT there is only one AR and itself is querier). In the multicast network SIGMP
proxy is in the Relay and acts as EU for the real Querier.
6.1.4 Receiver Access Control Interactions in AMT
As explained in Section 3.4, the Receiver Access Control (RAC) can be viewed at two
levels: the application level and the network level.
Access Control at Application level
We know that a PANA session consists of five phases (see section 3.4.1). In the
following we have explained how the PANA messages are exchanged during these
phases in AMT using PANA proxy and EAP proxy.
1. Handshake Phase: The PaC, on receiving a request from the upper layer to
join a multicast group, initiates a PANA session by sending a PCI message to
the Gateway thinking it is the PAA. Gateway finds it as a PANA packet and
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forwards it to the Relay. The Relay, having a PANA proxy acting as a PaC,
forwards the packet to the actual PAA. The response goes back from actual
PAA to PaC through the Relay and the Gateway.
2. Authentication and authorization phase: After the handshake phase, EAP pack-
ets carried by PANA will be exchanged between the PaC and the PAA. For bet-
ter understanding, we took an example of EAP-FAST method [9], an efficient
EAP method. This method has two phases, in which phase 1 is responsible
for TLS handshake resulting in a secure tunnel between peer and server. As
explained, EAP proxy acting as EAP server is in the Gateway and the EAP
peer is in the EU. The secure tunnel is formed between the EU and the Gate-
way (say STunnel1), resulting in a fresh secret key between them. The same
secure tunnel with another key is formed between the Relay and the PAA (say
STunnel2) during phase 1. In phase 2, EAP method payloads carrying user
credentials in PANA packets are transferred to the Gateway through STunnel1
and the Gateway, who shares the secret key with the EU during phase1, will
decrypt and forward them to the Relay through the AMT Tunnel (assuming
AMT tunnel is secured). Finally the Relay protects the payloads with keys
obtained in formation of STunnel2 and forwards the EAP message to the PAA.
The PAA verifies those credentials and authenticates EU and sends the results
back.
After a successful authentication, the PaC and PAA derive a Master Session
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Key (MSK). As the Gateway and the Relay are part of PANA exchanges and
acting as a friendly Man-in-Middle, they can compute the MSK as well. On
receiving the MSK the PAA transfers MSK to EPQ (Enforcement point in
Querier) using IPsec, with a key calculated in the normal way for two IPsec
peers [40].
3. Access Phase: PaC and EPG (Enforcement point in Gateway), Relay and EPQ
with acquired pre shared key (MSK) during authentication phase calculate the
secret key called PEMK (section 3.4.1 shows how to calculate PEMK) respec-
tively. As the EPs are on different devices they end up calculating different
PEMKs, i.e., PEMK1 between the PaC and the Gateway, PEMK2 between the
Relay and the actual Querier.
With those PEMKs, they establish a two different IPsecGSAs between them
for cryptographic protection of IGMP messages. Each IPsecGSA contains one
GSA-r (Group Security Association for reports) and one GSA-q (Group Security
Association for queries), for details see 6.1.4, 6.1.5. This phase is also used to
test liveness of the PANA session.
4. Re-authentication and Termination phases are similar to that described in 3.4.1,
except the fact that these PANA messages are exchanged through the AMT
Tunnel.
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Access Control at Network level
In SIGMP [24] some messages are protected by IPsec GSAs (Group Security Associ-
ation). In this protocol all the operations for OGQ (Open Group Query) and OGR
(Open Group Report) are retained from IGMPv3. However, for the access control of
secure groups, a few operations are added in it. The following subsection will describe
how SIGMP is fitted in to AMT.
EU Operations
Once the Authentication is done at application level, EU will make his/her request for
the network-level join and will send an SIGMP report message, believing it is being
sent to the real Q (In fact, it will be received by the SIGMP proxy in the Gateway).
If this is the first time, when the report is sent to the IPsec (GSA) module, GSAM
will be invoked to negotiate the cryptographic parameters (keys and SPIs see Section
6.1.5). The IPsec module will then be able to send the report protected by those secure
parameters to the Gateway where the SIGMP proxy (q) is implemented. The q in
gateway will forward the message to the Relay through a secured tunnel (assumed)
and finally the Relay will forward it to the actual Q that accepts the request.
Q Operations
On receiving a secured report, Q will invoke IPsec module to decrypt it. Later it
checks for multicast address and if the address indicates a secure group it performs
an address consistency verification. In this verification it compares the multicast
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address in the group record and destination address in the IP header. If verification
succeeds, it will proceed to update the group memberships and refresh the timers, if
not it will discard the report.
6.1.5 GSAM
Group Security Association Management Protocol (GSAM) manages IPsec GSAs in
two phases. In phase1, mutual authentication of EU and Q is done to achieve the
registration of an EU. In phase 2, Q creates and distributes SA pair (GSA-q, GSA-r),
named GSAM-TEK-SA to protect SIGMP messages (for details see [24]) .
Usually in IP multicast environment GSAM negotiations are done between EU and
real Q, but in AMT we must not let the EU to communicate directly with the actual
Q. For that as explained earlier, we implement an SIGMP proxy, which acts as querier
functionality (q) in the Gateway, so that EU starts mutual authentication with the
Gateway (q) using the derived PANA secret key, i.e., PEMK1. After authentication
is done the Gateway (q) creates and distributes GSAM-TEK-SA (SA pair) to EU.
On the other side of AMT tunnel SIGMP proxy acting as EU in the Relay performs
mutual authentication with the actual Querier (Q) using PEMK2 and receives an SA
pair from Q.
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6.2 Multiple Sessions in PANA
Basically PANA is designed to support a single session, which contains four phases:
Authentication and Authorization Phase, Access Phase, Re-authentication Phase and
Termination Phase. This is sufficient for its original intended use as a method for
controlling access of a device to the network.
In our case, we are using PANA plus EAP to control access to (potentially) multi-
ple multicast sessions. Therefore, we have to verify that PANA can support multiple
sessions in order to make AMT an efficient design.
For that we have explored Open Diameter-1.0.7. The project provides the com-
plete source code of Diameter and PANA and incomplete source code of EAP. For the
EAP source code, only two authentication methods MD5 and archie are supported.
Later, a new version of the project (1.0.8) is developed within our laboratory with
another EAP authentication method called EAP-FAST. Open Diameter also provides
three stable applications : aaad, nasd and pacd [23].
• aaad plays the role of the Diameter server and the EAP backend authentication
server.
• nasd plays the role of the Diameter client, EAP pass-through server and PANA
Agent (PAA)
• pacd plays the role of the PANA Client (PaC) and EAP client.
By tracing out the source code of Open Diameter project and research on the state
machines of EAP and PANA, we concluded that PANA is capable of handling multiple
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sessions simultaneously. Thus it is suitable for use in controlling access to multiple





To quicken the development of protocols and enhance their security, it is important
to have appropriate tools that support the analysis of these protocols and help to
find vulnerabilities in the early stages of development. Favorably, these tools should
be entirely automated, robust, expressive, and easily usable, so that they can be in-
tegrated into the protocol development and standardization processes to improve the
speed and quality of these processes. A number of (semi-)automated protocol analysis
tools have been proposed, e.g.[3, 31, 35], which can analyze small and medium-scale
protocols. However, scaling up to large scale Internet security protocols is a con-
siderable challenge, both scientific and technological. This challenge was met by a
team from several European universities and research organizations [4], who devel-
oped a formal modeling tool for validating the security properties of protocols, with
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Figure 12: AVISPA Structure
an emphasis on the IETF protocols. It has been used by members of the team to
validate the security properties of a significant number of IETF networking protocols
[4]. This tool is called Automated Validation of Internet Security-sensitive Protocols
and Applications (AVISPA). It is a ”push-button” tool, in the sense that once the
protocol under study has been modeled and the security goals stated, the rest of the
process of validating the security properties is automatic.
The architecture of AVISPA is shown in figure 12. The first step in using the tool
is to present the analyzed protocol in a special language called High Level Protocol
Specification Language (HLPSL). We discuss the HLPSL language in more detail
in the following section. The HLPSL presentation of the protocol is translated into
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the lower level language called Intermediate Format (IF). This translation is per-
formed by the translator called HLPSL2IF. This step is totally transparent to the
user. The IF presentation of the protocol is used as an input to the four different
back-ends: On-the-fly ModelChecker (OFMC), CL-based Attack Searcher (CL-AtSe),
SAT-based Model-Checker (SATMC) and Tree-Automata-based Protocol Analyzer
(TA4SP). These back-ends perform the analysis and output the results in a precisely
defined output format stating whether there are problems in the protocol or not.
Further explanation of the four back-ends is provided in Section 7.4.
7.2 High Level Protocol Specification Language
AVISPA uses High Level Protocol Specification Language (HLPSL) [4] to represent
the analyzed protocols. In this section we take a closer look into the structure of
HLPSL language according to the AVISPA tutorial [36]. In order to express the
protocols in HLPSL language, it is easiest to translate the protocols first into A-B
format, for instance:
A -> S: {Kab}_Kas
S -> B: {Kab}_Kbs
The notation above illustrates the Wide Mouth Frog (WMF) protocol [7], where
endpoints A and B attempt to set up a secure session. First A generates a new
session key Kab and encrypts it by using a key Kas and sends the encrypted key
to the trusted server S. Kas is a key that is shared between A and S. S decrypts
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the message, re-encrypts it by using a shared key Kbs and transmits the encrypted
message to B. B can decrypt the message by using the shared secret Kbs and obtains
the session key Kab. HLPSL language is a role-based language, which means that
actions of each participant are defined in a separate module, called a basic role. In
the case of the WMF example above, the basic roles are: Alice (A), Bob (B) and
server (S). Basic roles describe what information the corresponding participant has
initially (parameters), its initial state and how the state can change (transitions). To
continue the WMF example, the role of Alice would be expressed in following way:
role alice(A,B,S : agent,
Kas : symmetric_key,









The role indicates that agents A, B and S are participating in the protocol suite, A has
a shared key Kas with the agent S and A uses channels SND (send) and RCV (receive)
for communication. Currently, the only supported channel model for communication
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in AVISPA is Dolev-Yao (dy). AVISPA’s selection of this model is supported by
the fact that this model can emulate the actions of an arbitrary adversary, and it is
also very challenging because it gives advantage to the intruder as opposed to other
models. Dolev-Yao is a very strong model because it assumes that the intruder can
intercept every message in the channel and can build any message from the intercepted
messages using for that infinite memory and processing capabilities. It is also based
on perfect cryptography, which means that the intruder cannot decrypt a message M
ciphered with a key K with another key K’ different from K.
The section called local defines the local variables of Alice, which are State, which
is described by a natural number (nat), and symmetric key Kab. Initial state of Alice
is 0. The transition section describes received and sent messages and how they affect
the state of the role. For instance the role server has following transition called step1:
step1.State = 0 /\ RCV({Kab’}_Kas) =|>
State’:= 2 /\ SND({Kab’}_Kbs)
The transition means that if the server’s state is 0 and it receives a message from
its RCV channel containing a key Kab’ that is encrypted with a key Kas, the server
changes its state to 2, encrypts the key Kab’ with the Kbs and sends the encrypted
key to the channel SND. In addition to basic roles the HLPSL language defines so
called composition roles, which are used to combine several basic roles. Combining
the basic roles means that the roles can execute in parallel. The composition roles
define the actual protocol sessions. For instance, in the case of the WMF protocol
there are three basic roles Alice, Bob and Server. The composition role, called session,
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initiates one instance of each role and thus defines one protocol run. The composition
role does not define transitions the way basic roles do, instead it initiates basic roles
and defines channels used by the basic roles. The composition role is defined for
instance in the following way:
role session(A,B,S :agent,
Kas,Kbs :symmetric_key) def=
local SA, RA, SB, RB SS, RS: channel (dy)
composition
alice (A, B, S, Kas, SA, RA)
/\bob (B, A, S, Kbs, SB, RB)
/\server(S, A, B, Kas, Kbs, SS, RS)
end role
Finally the HLPSL defines a top level role, called here as environment, which contains
global variables and combines several sessions. This top level role can be used to define
what information an intruder has and where the intruder can access the protocol. For
example, the intruder may play a role of a legitimate user in a protocol run. The
following role definition shows how a top level environment can be defined. The letter
i in the definition indicates the intruder.
role environment()
def=
const a, b, s : agent,
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kas, kbs, kis : symmetric_key






Every security protocol has some goals that it is supposed to meet. In order to write
the protocol in HLPSL format, we must know these goals. The analysis is done against
the defined security goals and the results indicate whether the protocol meets the
goals or not. The security goals of the protocol are presented in an HLPSL language
section called goals. Security goals are actually defined in transition sections of basic
roles. The definitions of security goals in the transition section are called goal facts.
The goals section simply describes which combinations of these goal facts indicate an
attack [36]. Below there is an example of a goal fact. The notation means that Bob
allows that the key K1 can be shared with Alice, but it must remain secret between
the two. The second argument of the secret fact is called protocol id and it simply












1. State = 1 /\ RCV({Na’}_K) =|>







The HLPSL2IF translator translates HLPSL specification into an IF specification
automatically.
• First it will check the number of conditions met by phrasing the HLPSL speci-
fication.
• Then, the role description in hierarchical structure is flattened and translated
into step rules of IF.
56
• From the instantiation given in the HLPSL file, the initial state of IF is com-
puted.
• Finally, the goals are computed as a state-based encoding of the properties given
in the HLPSL file [17].
7.4 Back-ends
As Figure 12 shows, AVISPA integrates four different back-ends. Here the word
back-end means an entity that inputs a sequence of IF language statements, does
analysis and produces the analysis output. The four different back-ends used in
AVISPA, OFMC, CL-AtSe, SATMC and TA4SP, are complementary rather than
equivalent. Thus, the output of the back-ends may differ. All back-ends assume
perfect cryptography, which means that an attacker cannot solve encryption without
the knowledge of the whole key. Also, the transmission channel is assumed to be
controlled by a Dolev-Yao attacker. This means that the attacker has basically full
control over the channel [36].
7.4.1 The On-the-fly Model-Checker (OFMC)
OFMC [11] performs protocol classification and bounded validation by exploring the
transition system described by an IF specification in a demand-driven way. OFMC
implements a number of correct and complete symbolic techniques. It supports the
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specification of algebraic properties of cryptographic operators, and typed and un-
typed protocol models.
7.4.2 The Constraint-Logic-based Attack Searcher (CL-AtSe)
CL-AtSe [11] applies constraint solving as in [10], with some powerful simplification
heuristics and redundancy elimination techniques. CL-AtSe is built in a modular way
and is open to extensions for handling algebraic properties of cryptographic operators.
It supports type-flaw detection and handles associativity of message concatenation.
7.4.3 The SAT-based Model-Checker (SATMC)
SATMC [11] builds a propositional formula encoding a bounded unrolling of the tran-
sition relation specified by the IF, the initial state and the set of states representing
a violation of the security properties. The propositional formula is then fed to a
state-of-the-art SAT solver and any model found is translated back into an attack.
7.4.4 The Tree Automata based on Automatic Approxima-
tions for the Analysis of Security Protocols(TA4SP)
TA4SP [5] approximates the intruder knowledge by using regular tree languages and
rewriting. For secrecy properties, TA4SP can show whether a protocol is flawed
(by under-approximation) or whether it is safe for any number of sessions (by over-
approximation).
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7.5 Developing the HLPSL model
In this section we describe how we have transformed our model into HLPSL code to
achieve the end results.
• Our model in HLPSL code has four basic roles. They are client, server, gateway,
relay. The roles client and server serve as Pac and PAA respectively. As per
our model, gateway and relay are acting as a friendly man-in-middle, they form
SAs with client and server respectively and forward the EAP/PANA messages
accordingly. The roles of the gateway and the relay is important because as we
saw in Chapter 4, attacks are possible on both the gateway and the relay. So
we consider all four roles as main actors in HLPSL.
• In the real world, there are large number of clients asking for a specific multicast
application and they may request different multicast data streams as well. So,
there is a need to distinguish all these clients and their requests. For that reason
we have added constants such as request-id and response-id, which assign a
random unique number for each request made by clients. We transferred these
constants along with nonces of client and server in initial request messages.
• After few a initial messages, PANA starts carrying EAP method (EAP-FAST)
for authentication. As EAP-FAST is already validated between two nodes in
[30] and now we implement it among four nodes in our HLPSL code. As phase 1
in EAP-FAST results in shared key (SA) between two nodes, to make it simpler
we introduced a shared key K1 between client, gateway and K2 between relay
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and server. Client and gateway protects further data with K1 and relay and
server with K2.
• After authentication all the four roles are able to calculate secret key (MSK).
Using MSK and PANA nonces they calculate MAC (Message Authentication
Code) value as well. Our goal is to maintain the secrecy of secret keys MSK,
K1, K2. Section 7.7 describes more about goals. Derivation of secret key (MSK)
and MAC is shown in figure 13 below.
Figure 13: Derivation of Secret key and MAC
• After calculation of above mentioned keys, the results were passed to client from
server.
• Session role defines executing of several basic roles in parallel. In our HLPSL
code session role is composed of client, gateway, relay and server roles. Every
role has two channels, send and receive, on which they send and receive mes-
sages. We should run these four roles in parallel for messages to pass through
the AMT tunnel (See figure 14).
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Figure 14: Session Role
• In environment role, we can modify the number of parallel sessions and the
knowledge of intruder. In our code intruder has given the knowledge of all the
hash functions, agents and his own private key. First we executed a session
without any intruder. In next step we executed session with client as intruder
and then gateway, relay, server as intruders (See figure 15).
7.6 Validation of Our Model
In this section we describe how we modeled our architecture with HLPSL language
to meet the AVISPA validation requirements.
• EAP is a versatile framework that facilitates multiple authentication mecha-
nisms. It runs between a peer and a server. PANA is a network access authenti-
cation protocol that works as a link-layer (lower layer) protocol for transmitting
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Figure 15: Environment Role
EAP information. PANA carries EAP authentication methods (encapsulated
inside EAP packets) between a peer node and a server in the access network.
• As described in chapter 5 End User (with EAP peer, Pac), AMT Gateway will
reside on Unicast-only network and Server (with EAP server, PAA), AMT Relay
will reside on Multicast-enabled network. Now we have to make sure that the
same security considerations are met even if the EAP and PANA packets are
passed through AMT Gateway and Relay.
• The HLPSL language is a role-based language, which means the action se-
quences of each participant are defined in a separate module, called a basic
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role. Here, we define four general types of basic roles: the role client, role
server, role gateway and role relay which describe the initial information they
had and how their state can change.
• We defined global variables, local variables and constants for each basic role.
Agents, hash functions, shared secret keys and channels are defined as global
variables. Nonces, results are defined as local variables, which can be transferred
between agents through the transmission channels.
• HLPSL local variables can be changed and transferred but cannot be shared.
Yet, it is possible to share a constant value whenever we require roles to have
pre-shared knowledge.
• In the transition section we defined set of transitions, each one represents the
receipt of a message and sending of a reply message. We defined these transitions
according to an order in which the messages are transferred in PANA, EAP
protocols.
• Later we defined composed roles, which instantiate one or more basic roles by
gluing them together so they execute together, usually in parallel (with inter-
leaving semantics). A composed role instantiates one instance of each basic role
and thus describes one whole protocol session [12].
• Finally, role environment, which is a top-level role, is defined. It contains global
constants and a composition of one or more sessions, where the intruder may
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play some roles as a legitimate user. We can define intruder’s initial knowledge
in a statement, which includes names of all the agents, his private key and hash
functions, etc.
7.7 Security Goals
AVISPA allows us to define security goals [12] in HLPSL. It can be done by augment-
ing the transitions of the basic roles with so-called goal facts. Any kind of sensitive
data that has to be exchanged needs AVISPA back-ends to track its confidentiality,
integrity and safe transmission. Once we inform AVISPA about the goal facts, then
we need to assign a meaning by describing them in the HLPSL goal section. This
will clarify which combination of such facts indicates an attack.
The witness and request events are goal facts related to authentication of an agent.
We used them to check whether or not an agent is right in believing that its intended
peer that is actually present in current session, has reached a definite state in its
transition section and agrees on a certain value, which usually is a fresh nonce. The
fresh nonce is actually generated by each agent to authenticate the other one. HLPSL
will support general security goals such as-
• secrecy - If we want to express a certain value should be kept secret between
two or more agents, we use secrecy goal. It ensures the failure of an intruder to
discover the message exchanged between two roles that is supposed to be kept
secret.
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• authenticity - it verifies a distinguishing identifier claimed by or for an agent,
which may be a peer in a communication or the source of some data as a
server. The verification is achieved presenting authentication information that
collaborates the binding between the agent and the identifier.
7.7.1 Security Goals of our Model
In the goal section of our HLPSL code, we explicitly ask the AVISPA model checker
to validate the secrecy of both the shared secret keys (K1, K2) and MSK, which
ensures the intended security of further communications. Security goals are shown in
figure 16
Figure 16: Security Goals
65
7.8 AVISPA Results
Considering the security goals mentioned in goal section of our HLPSL code, no attack
has been found. Summary results of three AVISPA back-ends OFMC, CL-AtSe and
SATMC appeared to be safe. This shows our model (Receiver Access Control in
AMT) in reality is immune to all those potential attacks and threats.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
In this thesis we have proposed a solution that provides receiver access control for
multicast groups in the AMT environment. This solution allows only legitimate end
users in a unicast-only-network to access networks and receive multicast data from
multicast enabled sources. Later we explained how IGMP messages are secured with
IPsec GSAs. We have also discussed how our model supports multiple sessions, by
which an end user host can have multiple requests to different multicast groups and
receive data simultaneously. Finally, we have modeled our solution by using the
HLPSL description language. The validation result from AVISPA show our model is
invulnerable to any kind of attacks.
Our model is based on the assumption that the AMT tunnel is secured. Currently,
AMT tunnel has IGMP messages flowing through it; our design adds PANA, SIGMP
packets to the tunnel. Future work for researchers might be taking measures to secure
the Tunnel between Gateway and Relay, i.e., all the PANA, SIGMP messages and
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multicast data going through AMT tunnel must be secured, so that no intruder can

























1. State = 0 /\ RCV(start) =|>
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State’:=2 /\ SND(0)
2. State = 2 /\ RCV(Nps’) =|>
State’:=4 /\ Npc’ := new()
/\ SND(Npc’,request_id)
3. State = 4 /\ RCV(respond_id.S) =|>
State’:=6 /\ SND(start_eap_fast)
4. State = 6 /\ RCV({Nes’}_K1) =|>
State’:=8 /\ Nec’ := new()
/\ Psk’ := new()
/\ SND({Nec’}_K1,{Psk’}_K1)
/\ Msk’ := H(Nec’.Nes’.Psk’)
5. State = 8 /\ RCV(Mac’,Kid,Result) =|>





























1. State = 10 /\ RCV(0) =|>
State’:=12 /\ SND(0)
2. State = 12 /\ RCV(Nps’) =|>
State’:=14 /\ SND(Nps’)
3. State = 14 /\ RCV(Npc’,request_id) =|>
State’:=16 /\ SND(Npc’,request_id)
4. State = 16 /\ RCV(respond_id.S) =|>
State’:=18 /\ SND(respond_id.S)
5. State = 18 /\ RCV(start_eap_fast) =|>
State’:=20 /\ SND(start_eap_fast)
6. State = 20 /\ RCV(Nes’) =|>
State’:=22 /\ SND({Nes’}_K1)
6. State = 22 /\ RCV({Nec’}_K1,{Psk’}_K1) =|>
State’:=24 /\ SND(Nec’,Psk’)
7. State = 24 /\ RCV(Mac’,Kid,Result) =|>
State’:=26 /\ SND(Mac’,Kid,Result)
8. State = 26 /\ RCV(Mac’, Kid) =|>

























1. State = 11 /\ RCV(0) =|>
State’:=13 /\ SND(0)
2. State = 13 /\ RCV(Nps’) =|>
State’:=15 /\ SND(Nps’)
3. State = 15 /\ RCV(Npc’,request_id) =|>
State’:=17 /\ SND(Npc’,request_id)
4. State = 17 /\ RCV(respond_id.S) =|>
State’:=19 /\ SND(respond_id.S)
5. State = 19 /\ RCV(start_eap_fast) =|>
State’:=21 /\ SND(start_eap_fast)
6. State = 21 /\ RCV({Nes’}_K2) =|>
State’:=23 /\ SND(Nes’)
6. State = 23 /\ RCV(Nec’,Psk’) =|>
State’:=25 /\ SND({Nec’}_K2,{Psk’}_K2)
7. State = 25 /\ RCV(Mac’,Kid,Result) =|>
State’:=27 /\ SND(Mac’,Kid,Result)
8. State = 27 /\ RCV(Mac’, Kid) =|>

























1. State = 1 /\ RCV(0) =|>
State’:=3 /\ Nps’ := new()
/\ SND(Nps’)
2. State = 3 /\ RCV(Npc’,request_id) =|>
State’:=5 /\ SND(respond_id.S)
3. State = 5 /\ RCV(start_eap_fast) =|>
State’:=7 /\ Nes’ := new()
/\ SND({Nes’}_K2)
4. State = 7 /\ RCV({Nec’}_K2,{Psk’}_K2) =|>
State’:=9 /\ Msk’ := H(Nec’.Nes.Psk’)
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